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ABSTRACT
An analysis of the service provided by the MBTA's Red
Line was prompted by a significant public outcry about the
"problems on the Red Line". This paper focuses on the
critical issues regarding service: reliability,
predictability, congestion, communications and relative
performance. To do so, four questions were analyzed: (1)
What is the actual level of service provided? (2) What do
people think that level of service is? (3) Is there a
difference between perception and reality? (4) What can be
done about it [both improving actual and perceived service]?
The data collected centered on the main performance
variables of the service: headways (time between trains),
waiting times, travel times and riders' perceived waiting
times. Although prior to the survey numerous delays in
service were reported, during the survey service was fairly
close to schedule. However, riders perceived the service
provided as much worse than it really was, even when
compared to a control group on a similar rapid transit line.
It was concluded that although operational improvements can
and should be made, to address public perception of the
service significant strides to improve communications and
information about the service should be undertaken.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Arnold I. Barnett
Title: Associate Professor of Management Science
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Introduction
In late 1983 the MBTA was engaged in extending the Red
Line about three miles north of Harvard Square in Cambridge,
a project that required new track and a new station with
separate north and southbound tunnels be built at Harvard
Square. It also meant that a train entering Harvard Square
must first travel northbound about a mile to Davis Square
and then head back before resuming southbound passenger
service, which takes about 13 minutes.1 Because of this lag
time and the somewhat temporary nature of the facilities
being used, as well as some operational and safety reasons,
not as many trains could head northbound toward Harvard
Square as did previously; if they did, the trains would
simply 'backup' and wait inside the tunnel for the (first)
train to return from Davis Square. As this process was
first being implemented during late 1983, many delays in
service occurred. Today however, even though trains must
still go to Davis Square to turn around, the MBTA has
reportedly addressed the "problems" and, by the first of the
year, service was supposedly returned to normal.
However, during the first few months of 1984,
complaints about the MBTA's Red Line could be found (almost
daily) somewhere in either the print or broadcast media.
Excerpts such as these were typical:
"She is a daily commuter, a rider on the MBTA's
Red Line...She feels beaten down and discouraged.
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Simply put, this transit system, this Red Line
spoils too many of her days."
- The Boston Sunday Globe
Magazine Section, 22 April 1984
"The Globe and the Herald are full of little stories
[about the Red Line problems]. Mass transit is
getting worse, not better. The T is a disgrace, a
headache and a nightmare. I pity those forced to
rely on it."
- The Cambridge TAB
Commentary Section,
8 February 1984
"It [Red Line service] is going to be a disaster."
- The Patriot Ledger
20 February 1984
In fact, when daily Red Line riders were surveyed, the words
they used most frequently to describe service were,
"terrible", "horrible" and "awful". 2 Although these are
somewhat nebulous complaints, after discussions with over
250 Red Line riders, I found that their complaints focus on
a few basic issues. These are predictability, reliability,
congestion, relative performance and poor communications.
Predictability refers to the "unpredictable" length of
time spent waiting for train(s) to arrive. Although usually
a small fraction of total trip time, waiting time is often
the most aggravating - "especially during cold winter days
and nights". Riders report that waiting times can vary by
over 100 percent: "[from] five, ten, to sometimes even
fifteen minutes!' 4  Lewjean Holmes, currently Executive
Director of the MBTA Advisory Board, has stated that
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"unpredictable on-time performance is a persistent problem
with the system." 5
Reliability refers to the variance over the entire
trip time - which is waiting time plus time in transit.
Riders complain that while en route, trains frequently make
unplanned, "unexplained" temporary stops. To some extent,
since the Red Line tracks form essentially a closed loop,
reliability variance is reflected in the waiting times
(predictability) - but the combination of "long" waiting
times and "significant" variance in travel times result in
even further frustration. These two quantifiable
performance variables (reliability and predictability) will
be the basis for most of the empirical work presented in
Chapters 2 and 3.
Conversations with riders also reveal there is much
confusion surrounding the relative level of service provided
to the two southbound areas the Red Line serves: for
example, one (Ashmont) rider noted that the MBTA schedules
at least twice as many trains to Braintree as to Ashmont,
yet within fifteen minutes, a (Braintree) rider mentioned
that he 'often' sees two Ashmont trains in a row, before a
Braintree train arrives. [When Red Line trains leave
southbound out of Boston, they separate onto one of two
tracks: some head for the South Shore (Braintree), and
others for Dorchester (Ashmont).] As with reliability,
objective performance measures can be derived, and will be
presented in subsequent chapters. The fourth concern,
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congestion, on both the station platforms and the trains
will be addressed similarly. Finally, confounding all four
of these issues, are the communications problems cited by
nearly all riders. Specific complaints address the
inadequate information regarding the arrival time of the
next train, its destination, the reasons for 'problems', and
the 'daily' announcements, noting that, "the delays on the
Red Line are due to a disabled train at...". This will also
be examined fully in subsequent chapters.
Riders mentioned other issues: coordination with
buses, cross-overs and express trains, expensive fares and
parking fees, cleanliness of the platforms and trains,
general mismanagement and "The Union". 6 These are important
issues and are studied annually by the MBTA Advisory Board
and the Massachusetts State Auditors Department; I will
devote some time to these issues in later chapters as well.
However, the majority of this thesis will emphasize the five
major issues described above - since they represent the
dominant concerns of most riders.
To examine these issues, I'll address four general
questions:
(1) What is the level of service the Red Line
"really" provides?
(2) What do most people "think" the level of service
is?
(3) What, if any, is the difference between "reality"
and perception?
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(4) What can be done to improve the actual service
and the difference between reality and
perception?
Answering these questions will not only provide the
means to examine the main concerns of the Red Line riders,
but also be the method of attaining the three main goals of
this thesis.
This first goal is simply to provide an objective
assessment of the service provided by the MBTA's Red Line.
Very little data regarding the distributions (mean and
variance) of either waiting times or travel times are
available - "unbiased" statistics are even more scarce:
presently the MBTA's main performance measures are
throughput (number of trains through given station in given
amount of time) and scheduled runs accomplished - yet,
neither of these give accurate indications of the variance
(or distribution) of waiting times or travel times. Since
it appears that many (if not most) of the Red Line riders
are dissatisfied with service, a comprehensive survey that
addresses the issues enumerated above will, at least,
provide better insight for both riders and management of the
Red Line. In this sense, the impact of this paper is meant
to be immediate and pragmatic.
A second goal is meant to be a logical extension of
the first. The Red Line is not unique in being a highly
utilized urban mass transit system. In Boston alone we have
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three similar transit lines, not to mention the many other
similar transit systems in other urban centers such as New
York, Washington, D.C., Paris, and London. Although some of
the operational issues are singular to the Red Line, the
basic questions, sampling techniques, statistical
methodologies, general scope and suggestions for improvement
should be applicable to these other transit networks.
Consequently, this second goal, though longer term and
inductive, is meant to be somewhat straight forward.
The final goal, however, is more elusive, yet possibly
more widely applicable. As the Red Line is not unique in
its role as transit network, it is also not unique in its
"attraction" of complaints regarding service. In Boston,
other subsets of the transit system are subject to public
criticism: other subway lines, commuter rail lines, buses
and so forth. Other cities' transit systems are subjective
to similar criticism as well. Throughout this thesis, the
difference between reality and perception is analyzed for
waiting times for subway trains, but the experimental design
and implications for management may possibly be applied to
other services involving waiting times as well; for
examples, elevator usage, airline reservation systems, waits
for professional services (medical, etc.), and many other
activities involving travel. The difference between
perception and reality is everpresent; as a final goal, this
thesis will address this phenomenon.
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As an outline, the four questions listed previously
form the basis for the four main chapters which address:
actual service, perceived service, the difference between
the two and suggestions for improvement. Specific
methodologies, experimental design, decision variables,
statistical methods and data analysis are described in
detail within each respective chapter. For illustrative
purposes, I first offer a brief chapter describing the MBTA,
and specifically, the operational issues regarding the Red
Line.
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Chapter 1: Operational Issues of the Red Line 7
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA
or more commonly known as simply, the "T") is responsible
for providing "safe, reliable transportation for the
commuting public" in 79 cities and towns within the Boston
metropolitan area. To do so, the MBTA operates three rapid
transit lines (subways, elevated and surface third rail
trains), which includes the Red Line, an extensive street
car system (known as the Green Line), a commuter rail
network and about 1000 buses. Each weekday over 530,000
people use one or more of the MBTA's services. This, the
nation's oldest urban mass transit system, has a 1984 annual
operating expense of about 400 million dollars - about a
third of which comes from passenger fares, the remainder
being provided by a combination of local, state and federal
funding. [For comparison, Washington, D.C.'s METRO system
operates on an annual budget of about 400 million dollars,
carries only about 300,000 riders daily; New York City's
Transit Authority operates with an annual budget of about
1.4 billion dollars, yet services nearly 3.4 million riders
daily.] 8
The Red Line carries 39% of all riders on the MBTA
rapid transit system - about 125,000 passengers each weekday
- over two-thirds of whom ride during the morning and peak
commuting "rush" hours. The Red Line (see map on the
following page) runs underground (except for one bridge)
from Harvard Square in Cambridge to the north, southbound
-12-
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through Boston's central business district (CBD) and then
separates into two surface lines at Andrew Station in South
Boston whereupon Braintree trains head southeast to the
south shore, and Ashmont trains head southwest into
Dorchester. Between Andrew station and Harvard Square
station, riders can use either an Ashmont or a Braintree
train. Unlike parts of New York City's subway system the
Red Line has only two tracks - consequently, there are no
separate local and express trains. Most riders therefore
attempt to board the next available train.
The Red Line is a major commuter link - between 15,000
and 18,000 people use the Braintree line, 10,000 to 12,000
use the Ashmont line and about another 10,000 to 12,000 come
in on the train from Cambridge (north of the city) during
each rush, morning and afternoon. Most trips on the
Braintree line originate from Quincy Center, Quincy Adams
and Braintree stations; on the Ashmont line, from Ashmont,
Shawmut and Fields Corner stations; and on the north side of
the line from Harvard Square and Central Square stations.
Most trips end up at Boston's CBD, which is serviced by the
Park and Washington Street stations. As the map
illustrates, these stations, which are only about
one-quarter of a mile apart, provide access to the other
rapid transit lines of the MBTA system. Not surprisingly,
the origin and destination patterns are basically reversed
for the afternoon rush.
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[Some statistics to help interpret the accompanying
maps: Harvard Square to Braintree is 15.2 miles, Harvard
Square to Ashmont is 9.2 miles; for a train to go to
Braintree and back from Harvard Square takes about 90
minutes, to Ashmont and back, a little under 80 minutes.
Between Park Street and Harvard Square station, a train is
scheduled to take about 10.5 minutes (about 3.5 miles). The
approximately two miles between Park Street and Andrew
station is scheduled to take about seven minutes:
proportionately longer because there are more stations that
are more heavily patronized. From Andrew to Ashmont, a
train is scheduled to take about nine minutes (3.7 miles);
to Braintree nearly 20 minutes (9.6 miles).]
Operationally, besides the aforementioned construction
project extending service northbound from Harvard Square,
there are several noteworthy features regarding the Red
Line. These include a somewhat experimental automatic train
operator system (ATO), which sets the speed and the distance
between trains; the use of some of the oldest equipment in
the MBTA system; significant logistics "problems" regarding
resource (train-car) availability, preventative maintenance,
repair yard locations and the actual on-line daily
scheduling system of the Red Line trains. These issues,
though only mentioned here, are addressed fully in
Appendix 1. One operational issue however demands further
elaboration.
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Currently, the main automobile commuting expressway
into Boston from the south is undergoing reconstruction.
This has increased patronage on the Red Line, especially the
Braintree line. To address this, the "T" has scheduled more
trains to Braintree and planned "cross-overs" (turnarounds)
at a mechanical switch at Park Street station for between
four to six trains each rush. This reduces round trip times
to Braintree by over half an hour, thereby reducing
headways, waiting times and congestion. It also helps avoid
backups to Harvard Square as mentioned earlier. [This
particular scheduling pattern began on March 10, 1984,
hence, the two different headway figures for the Braintree
line presented in Table 1.1, which will be discussed later.]
Although this scheduling pattern is not planned
substantially to affect service either northbound to Harvard
Square or southbound to Ashmont, riders on these routes
often complain that these turnarounds are examples of the
"problems" on the Red Line. Further, it must be noted that
currently there is undercapacity for the south side service
[i.e., the number of trains available are not fully
sufficient to carry the amount of people on the trains at
design capacity (170 people/car), although at extremely
"crowded" (250 people/car) crush capacity it is possible]
and over-capacity (more than enough to carry at design
payload) on the northside. On Red Line cars, there are
seats for between 65 and 75 people; so, it is planned that
nearly 100 will stand, but as this increases over 100, it
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gets (very) uncomfortable. This congestion factor is a
major complaint since waiting for a second train, or riding
a long time in a hot (or cold) car standing jammed against
many others, are both undesirable. This is a complex issue
and will be addressed in the following chapters.
Finally, with these operational considerations
mentioned and the material in Appendix 1 presented, I will
briefly describe the overall scheduling process for Red Line
trains. The key variable is headways, which is the length
of time between trains. [For this report headways are
further defined to include the time spent in station and to
exclude trains taken out of service or those unavailable for
passengers]. Headway length, for the most part, defines
service levels such as waiting time, reliability and
congestion.
Headway lengths are chosen with many of the
aforementioned factors in mind; foremost of these are the
number of expected riders, the number of cars/trains
available and the planned trip times for certain routes.
For example, about 10,000 people ride the Ashmont line each
rush hour. Since trains consist of four cars each, (each
car with a capacity of about 225 people), each train can
carry about 900 people. (Actually, this fluctuates between
about 750 and 1000 depending on size of the "crush"
congestion). If each train makes a single trip per rush,
then 11 trains are needed to get the 10,000 people home.
Therefore, if 11 trains are available for the Ashmont line,
-17-
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since each round trip takes about 80 minutes, the "T" will
schedule a uniform headway of 7.3 minutes apart. In
practice however, due to fluctuations in car and personnel
availability and patronage patterns, scheduling is a bit
more complicated, but this is essential in the process:
Table 1.1 offers the MBTA's scheduled headways for the Red
Line during the first four months of 1984.
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Table 1. 1
SCHEDULED HEADWAY TIMES (RUSH HOURS ONLY)**
Planned Headway
Station (minutes)
Northside:
Morning - From Harvard Sq. Southbound
* To Park/Wash. (as far as Andrew) 4
Ashmont line only 8
Braintree line only 8
Afternoon - Northbound
* From Park/Wash. (from Andrew) 4
Southside:
Morning and Afternoon
* To and From Ashmont 8
* To and From Braintree
January 18 - March 10 6.5-7
March 10 - Present 5.5-6
** Note: Headways are increased to about 11 minutes during
the non-peak hours to/from Ashmont and Braintree;
to/from Harvard Square increased to 5.5 to 6 minutes.
The coordination of Ashmont and Braintree trains is
discussed in Appendix 1.
* Service that is examined further in Chapters 2 and 3. It
should be noted that the planned headways do fluctuate
about half a minute over the course of an entire rush
hour.
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Chapter 2: The Actual Service
In this chapter, I will analyze the actual service
provided by the Red Line during the first four months of
1984. Since over two-thirds of all riders used the Red Line
during the peak commuting hours of 7:30 AM to 9:30 AM and
4:15 PM to 5:50 PM, I'll focus analysis on these weekday
times. Furthermore, since reliability and predictability
are the main concerns of riders, the distributions for
headways, waiting times and travel times will be the main
performance (decision) variables analyzed.
Our "population" will be the rush hour service
provided on the 71 non-holiday weekdays between January 18,
1984 and May 2, 1984. It was impractical to gather data for
two rush hours, each day, at every station. Consequently, a
sampling method was devised to be representative of the most
heavily travelled routes and stations (see Appendix 2).
Briefly, since the distribution of headways is independent
across days, yet less so (due to the effect that long delays
cause) during a given rush hour, sampling days were randomly
chosen in advance to reflect a "fair" (equally likely)
representation of rush hours during the week (Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, etc.) and across the four month study
period. For example, on the north side of the line, data
was collected on 15 separate afternoon rush hours, yielding
over 300 headways (and waiting times) and nearly 80 travel
times. More data was collected for the north side of the
line (between Park Street and Harvard Square), because, as
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mentioned earlier, operational delays in late 1983 affected
the service noticeably more. Given that and the fact that
passengers usually use either the north side (Harvard Square
to Park or Washington Street), or the south side of the line
(Ashmont/Braintree to Park); I'll address these two areas
separately - the northbound side first.
As mentioned during the morning rush, the "T" plans
about a 4 minute headway out of Harvard Square southbound to
Park and Washington Streets (in fact by estimates from my
sampling and the "T" this is the headway that 85-90% of the
riders face who get off before Andrew station). A sample of
six days (88 headways generated a mean headway of 4.93
minutes) with a standard deviation of 3.14 minutes (see
Table 2.1). This in turn generates an average wait for
passengers at Harvard Square in the morning of 3.47 minutes
(standard deviation of 3.2 minutes).9
Note that the mean waiting time is not simply half of
the average headway time because since people arrive at the
station platform at approximately a uniform rate during the
rush hours, more people will arrive during longer headway,
skewing the waiting time distribution to the left as
compared to the headway distribution. This "hogging
effect"1 0 concept is critical to the derivation of the
expected waiting times. Consequently the method of deriving
these statistics follows. [The formulas described are used
throughout the paper.]
-21-
0 0C a
0
E: -4
.rtI
-22-
U)
4Jrd
-H
a•-
*d H
5E0
t-I
H
o-c
o n4
NtC
Lr
*:5 m
MCd
Od
0 4O
rc
0-0
8
dA
a
4-'
O0O
4-4 .4_)
In general, if the total number of headways for a
given rush hour route (e.g., morning rush from Harvard
Square) is N, and the average headway length is/A , then
the total amount of time for all headways (of each rush hour
route) is Ni•X . Therefore, assuming a uniform arrival
rate, a person arriving in a headway of length x waits, on
average, x/2 minutes. Moreover, iffy is the proportion of
headways of length x [i.e., number of headways in a sample
of length x divided by total number of headways in the
sample, N], then the probability a rider arrives in a
headway of length x is (XNf //X4'A). Note that this fraction
is simply the ratio of the number of minutes (riders spent
waiting) in a headway of length x divided by the (total)
number of minutes for all headways of the given rush
examined.
The x in the numerator of the last expression
incorporates the "hogging effect", that is, for longer
headways, x is larger and so is the probability of arriving
in a headway of x. Multiplying the probability of arriving
in a headway of length x times the average wait for a given
headway, and summing over all headways (values of x) yields
the avarage wait for a given rush E(w). That is
= -5 ()$ x
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which is equivalent to
E (><)x'
An algebraic rearrangement using the formula for variance
yields: 
-1 2.I ~ AA
In a similar manner
waiting times 6 (LA)
E (x')
Z E (x)
Ox -/V IX
we can derive the variance for
d5
-E (Lx
2- E ( x)
[For the calculations I'll use the sample mean and variance
as the maximum likelihood estimator for the population
statistics. Moreover, since the data gathered can be used
to generate sample distributions, the waiting time
distribution can be derived. This derivation will appear in
Chapter 3.]
Since this is a relatively small sample size, I'll
compare the derived values with a regular rider's actual
travel times during the morning rush hour out of Harvard
Square. Ms. Grace Locke, a rider on the north side of the
MBTA's Red Line for several years, timed her trips nearly
every morning between February 8, 1984 and April 27, 1984, a
total of 53 days, representing nearly 75% of the entire
population of morning rush hours. A summary of the data she
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gathered is presented in Table 2.2. A comparison with this
data may not only corroborate the sample, but it may be more
representative of what regular riders actually face (i.e.,
one trip per rush hour). Although travel times ranged from
6 to 28 minutes, her mean travel time was 11 minutes
(standard deviation of about four minutes). Since the trip
is scheduled to take about 6 minutes, by subtraction this
indicates an average wait of about 5 minutes for the trains
out of Harvard Square during the morning rush. However,
when a minute is subtracted from the mean waiting time to
account for the approximate amount of time Ms. Locke spent
walking to (and from) the platforms [from the collection
booth turnstyles], the mean waiting time is closer to the 4
minutes scheduled for this route. [Note that these figures
do not deny that on several occasions people waited more
than five minutes; rather, they simply provide an estimate
of the average waiting time. A more extensive distribution
is derived in Chapter 3 that offers probabilities for
several times.]
For the afternoon service the "T" also has about a 4
minute headway. A sample of 15 days (309 headways) out of
Park Street bound for Harvard Square generated a mean
headway of 4.34 minutes (standard deviation of 2.83
minutes). Deriving the waiting time distribution as was
done for the morning rush, yields a mean waiting time of
3.09 minutes (standard deviation of 2.58 minutes). Although
this is a much larger sample size, Ms. Locke's data for 49
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actual afternoon travel times yielded a waiting time of a
little over four minutes, which is fairly close to planned.
However, it should be noted that the trains are often
already crowded by the time they get to Kendall Square
during the afternoon rush; consequently, there were several
more outliers in the afternoon data, e.g., 40 minutes, as
Ms. Locke waited several times for a second train due to
congestion on the first. So, in conclusion, an analysis of
the sample data gathered indicates service during the survey
period was close to as planned. [See Table 2.1.]
As a final statistic, a sample of afternoon travel
times between Park and Harvard Square was completed over
four days (85 travel times): the mean was 11.01 minutes,
(standard deviation was 1.65 minutes). This is extremely
close to the planned travel times of 10.5 minutes. From the
data gathered, it appears that most of the variance in total
travel times is due to waiting at the station variance
(versus time in transit variance) - this can be seen in the
relatively low standard deviations for actual trip times
versus the relative high standard deviations for waiting
times. [This again is surprising for many people mentioned
that time in transit varies greatly.]
Assessing the southbound afternoon rush-hour service
out of Park or Washington Street stations is a bit more
complex for a number of reasons. First of all, over 75% of
the riders can only take either a Braintree or an Ashmont
train. Secondly, there is undercapacity on both south sides
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of the line. Lastly, there is the changing of planned
headways in the Braintree line. (These three issues are
discussed in Chapter 1). The Ashmont line is a bit easier
so I will address it first.
The "T" plans a headway of eight minutes on the
Ashmont line (during the rush). My sample of 14 days (148
headways) generated an actual headway mean of 8.16 (standard
deviation of 3.62). This in turn indicates a waiting time
mean of 4.88 minutes (standard deviation of 3.64). [See
Table 2.1 and Appendix 3A for further data.]
On the Braintree line, before March 10, the "T"
planned between a 6.5 and 7.0 minute headway; my sample of
seven days (85 headways) indicated a mean headway of 6.94
and a standard deviation of 3.28 minutes - which in turn
implies a mean waiting time of 4.25 minutes. After
March 10, the "T" increased the number of trains and planned
to reduce the headways to between 5.5 and 6.0 minutes. My
sample of seven days (105 headways) reveals a headway mean
of 6.05 minutes with a standard deviation of 3.67 minutes,
but because of the higher variance, this generated a mean
wait of 4.14 minutes - nearly as long as when the "T" had
fewer trains on the Braintree linell [see Table 2.1]. This
variance may be due to the initial operational difficulties
experienced when changing the schedule, but much of this
data was gathered during the last few days of April - over a
month and a half later. Initially, the plan was implemented
in response to the increased round trip travel times to
-28-
Braintree and the increased patronage. So this is not meant
to imply the "T" should abandon this new schedule, since at
the least this reduces congestion, but consideration may be
warranted on how to allocate their scarce resources (i.e.,
maybe shift more trains to Ashmont as well?).
Although not as extensive, data was gathered for the
morning southside service and some important information can
be highlighted. During the morning rush, one Braintree line
rider gathered his actual waiting times at Wollaston station
(near Quincy Center); his sample of 20 days yielded an
average wait of 3.75 minutes (standard deviation of 2.3
minutes) and an average trip time of about 24 minutes to
Kendall Square - which were both within schedule times.
[Trips only as far as Park Street are much more common and
are subject to less variance due to the crossover trains and
some delays due to the mechanical problems on the Longfellow
Bridge between Charles and Kendall Square stations.]
Unfortunately, no morning data was gathered from the Ashmont
line.
As with the northside, it appears that service is
surprisingly close to schedule; though with a little more
variability. But what of the numerous complaints of poor
service noted in the introduction? The next chapter
addresses this question.
-29-
Chapter 3: Perception of Service
In this chapter, I will present what people think
about the Red Line service, compare it with the actual
service and analyze the difference. To do so, I'll focus on
the variable of waiting time. Waiting time captures many of
the critical issues cited by riders (from their
perspective): unpredictability, reliability and congestion.
Before presenting the data on the perception of service,
I'll describe the methodology used to obtain the data.
The general plan is to derive and compare two
probability distributions, one for the actual waiting times
and one for the perceived waiting times. Deriving the
first, given the sample data collected for Chapter 2, is
actually relatively straight-forward. Using the concept
discussed in Chapter 212, we can derive the probability of
waiting exactly z minutes. As shown the probability of
arriving in a headway of exactly x minutes is XfX//Ax *
Moreover, the chance of waiting more than z minutes for a
train, given that one arrives in a headway of length x is
(x-z)/x. (Note: x must be greater than z for someone to
wait over z minutes.] Multiplying these two generates the
probability of waiting at least z minutes:
Pr (Wait at Iea; = x
-Z minvj- e5 X(x
To get the probability of waiting z minutes or more, one
just sums for all values greater than z, that is
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Pr (waiting z minutes or more) =
X = 4+15
[The derived probabilities are presented in Table 3.1 - the
data for the Blue Line Government Center is explained
later.]
I have chosen to examine four values (or more
accurately the probabilities of waiting four or more
specific amounts of time): 3, 5, 7 and 10 minutes. There
are several reasons for choosing these times, all having to
do with the derivation of the second distribution - riders'
perceived waiting times.
Since I would be asking numerous people how long they
waited for "x" minutes, I wanted "x" to correspond with
reality somewhat, therefore, encouraging rational responses.
These particular four numbers were chosen because they seem
to represent numbers often used when estimating time, for
examples: "I'll be there in ten minutes," or "give me five
minutes, will ya?" For the survey, riders were asked for
the "percentage of time that [they) waited "x" minutes or
more for [their] train [to arrive at the station]". Riders
were asked for only one estimate each, thereby avoiding
someone from revising their estimate as a new "x" value is
offered. [Each rider surveyed had to have ridden the
particular Red Line route in question at least four days a
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Table 3.1
DERIVED ACTUAL WAITING TIME PROBABILITIES
Probability of Waiting More Than:
Station/Rush 3 min. 5 min. 7 min. 10 min.
At Harvard Sq. 55.2% 22.8% 13.7% 6.1%
during morning
rush - south*
At Park/Wash. 57.9% 29.1% 12.0% 2.6%
- north (to
Harvard Sq.)
At Park/Wash. 61.1% 42.1% 26.4% 16.9%
- south (to
Ashmont only)
At Park/Wash. 52.9% 30.9% 16.4% 5.3%
- south (to
Braintree)
At Govt. Ctr. 45.0% 9.9% 2.8% 0.1%
- outbound
Blue Line
* Includes aforementioned headway of 45 minutes due to fire
on March 9, 1984.
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week from at least the beginning of the year.] About 100
people, chosen as randomly as possible (over several days at
many different places on the platform) during the rush hour
in question, were asked for estimates - about 25 at each "x"
value. Consequently, a distribution of perceived waiting
times could be derived - as Table 3.2 presents.
Even before comparison with the actuals in Table 3.1,
an examination of Table 3.2 reveals a few surprising
results. Given the nature of the question, one would expect
the highest probability for three minutes or more and a
decrease for the subsequent three numbers (that is, if one
waited ten minutes, s/he would have waited 3, 5, and 7
minutes as well). For most of the data, this is exactly the
case. However, just slightly at "x=7" for the northside to
Harvard Square passengers in the afternoon, and noticeably
more for the southside to Ashmont afternoon riders, a minor
deviation occurs. There are few reasons why this may have
occurred. For example, sampling error (the sample standard
deviation was about 20 percentage points), unexpected
perception of the value "x=7" or a desire on the riders'
part to "exaggerate" his/her perception for these higher
numbers in hopes that this may lead to a "fixing" of the
service. However, the difference this phenomenon make is
actually quite minor; therefore I'll "smooth" these
particular figures to "give the riders (and the survey) the
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Table 3.2
PERCEIVED WAITING TIME PROBABILITIES*
Probability of Waiting More Than:
Station/Rush 3 min. 5 min. 7 min. 10 min.
At Harvard Sq. 58% 43% 39% 30%
during morning (55) (23) (14) (6)
rush - south
At Park/Wash. 72% 45% 49% 40%
- north (to (58) (29) (12) (3)
Harvard Sq.)
At Park/Wash. 80% 54% 79% 84%
- south (to (61) (42) (26) (17)
Ashmont only)
At Park/Wash. 80% 73% 58% 54%
- south (to (53) (31) (16) (5)
Braintree)
At Govt. Ctr. 44% 23% 11% 8%
- outbound (45) (10) (3) (0)
Blue Line
* Actual probabilities from Table 3.1 in percentage are
presented in the parentheses.
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benefit of the doubt". As Table 3.2A illustrates, the
change is only very slight - consequently only the adjusted
figures will be used hereafter.
Given that, Table 3.3A presents the difference between
the perceived and actual waiting times (by both subtraction
of the corresponding data values and ratios) . It is clear
that there is substantial difference between reality and
perception for the Red Line service. In fact, several
points are worth noting.
For instance, even though the actual service provided
to the north side of the line (to/from Harvard Square) is
about the same for the morning and afternoon rushes, the
difference between actual and perceived waits, which are
derived from essentially the same population of riders, are
noticeably larger for the afternoon rush (by about 10% at
each value of "x"). This may be because people are more
tired and frustrated at the end of the day versus the
beginning and consequently tend to exaggerate more. Another
reason may be that in the afternoon while at Park Street
riders northbound can "see" more activity than when at
Harvard Square (i.e., the trains on the other side heading
southbound and the cross-over or turnarounds trains on their
side), and subsequently expect more service. In fact, these
cross-over trains (as described in Chapter 1) were mentioned
by many riders as something that in particular bothered them
about the service. [Although the cross-over trains do
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Table 3.2A
ADJUSTED PERCEIVED WAITING TIME PROBABILITIES**
Probability of Waiting More Than:
Station/Rush 3 min. 5 min. 7 min. 10 min.
At Harvard Sq. 58% 43% 39% 30%
during morning (55) (23) (14) (6)
rush - south
At Park/Wash. 72% 47% 47% 40%
- north (to (58) (29) (12) (3)
Harvard Sq.)*
At Park/Wash. 80% 72% 72% 72%
- south (to (61) (42) (26) (17)
Ashmont only)*
At Park/Wash. 80% 73% 58% 54%
- south (to (53) (31) (16) (5)
Braintree)
At Govt. Ctr. 44% 23% 11% 8%
- outbound (45) (10) (3) (0)
Blue Line
* Contains adjusted values.
** Actual probabilities from Table 3.1 in paretheses.
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Table 3.3A*
ADJUSTED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PERCEIVED AND
ACTUAL WAITING TIMES
Probability of Waiting More Than:
Station/Rush 3 min. 5 min. 7 min. 10 min.
At Harvard Sq. 4% 22% 28% 25%
during morning (1.1) (1.9) (2.8) (5.0)
rush - south
At Park/Wash. 14% 18% 35% 37%
- north (to (1.2) (1.6) (3.9) (13.3)
Harvard Sq.)
At Park/Wash. 20% 30% 46% 55%
- south (to (1.3) (1.7) (2.8) (4.2)
Ashmont only)
At Park/Wash. 27% 46% 42% 49%
- south (to (1.5) (2.4) (3.6) (10.8)
Braintree)
At Govt. Ctr. 1% 13% 8% 8%
- outbound (1.0) (2.3) (3.7) (**)
Blue Line
* For further illustration the values in the parentheses
are the ratios of (perceived wait)/(actual wait).
** Undefined.
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lengthen specific headways they are relatively
inconsequential on their impact on service over the duration
of the route.
Another highlight of the table illustrates that the
riders on the north side of the line often make "better"
estimates than the southside riders. For instance, at "x=3
minutes or more", afternoon riders to Harvard Square
exaggerate by 14%, while afternoon riders to Ashmont
exaggerate by 20%, and riders to Braintree exaggerate by
27%. At ten minutes or more, Harvard Square riders
exaggerated by 37%, Ashmont riders exaggerated by 55%, and
Braintree riders exaggerated by 49%. This occurance may
also be due to a number of the operational factors discussed
in Appendix 1. For instance, the southside line is run
under capacity, while the north side is run with over
capacity - that is, southside riders are more congested. It
may be that northside riders make better estimates because
they ride in less congested, crowded conditions.
Conversely, southside riders who are more crowded may be
more frustrated which may lead to comparative
"over-exaggeration". Another confounding factor may be that
while northside riders can take the first available train
out of Park Street, southside riders must wait for a
specific train, either Ashmont or Braintree. Since trains
do not arrive in a strictly alternating pattern, confusion
also arises, which may lead to frustration and further
exaggeration. Finally, there is the simple fact that trains
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run more frequently northbound to Harvard Square - headways
are roughly half that of the headways faced by southbound
riders.
The last example deals with the inference that people
on all the Red Line routes exaggerate more for bigger values
of "x". For examples, afternoon northbound riders
exaggerated by 4% at three minutes or more, but 25% at 10
minutes or more, afternoon Braintree-bound riders
exaggerated by 49% at 10 minutes or more, and so on. [Note:
the increase in the ratios illustrate this as well. For
instance, Braintree riders said they waited 7 minutes or
more 3.6 times as often as they actually did; whereas they
said only 1.5 times as often for 3 minutes or more.] Some
of the variation across "x-values" can be attributed to the
fact that, if "x" is low enough, a rider cannot exaggerate
at all. In other words, if people tend to exaggerate at all
levels of "x", then for larger (actual) values of "x", there
cannot be as much exaggeration since the limit of the
probability is 100%; conversely, when the probability is low
(as for higher values of "x"), there is simply more range
over which one can exaggerate. Another reason many people
were more liberal with their estimates for relatively high
values of "x" may be that perhaps ten minutes seems more
"abstract" or flexible than "three minutes", therfore making
it easier to exaggerate.
However, is it really surprising that people
exaggerate about waiting times? Doesn't "everybody"
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exaggerate about how much time they "spend waiting", not
just Red Line riders. [In the beginning of this thesis we
noted that during late 1983 there were many delays that
(actually) occurred on the Red Line; however, as shown,
these were effectively reduced (fixed) during the first four
months of 1984.] Was it the combination of these past
experiences and public attention that led to the
exaggeration by the Red Line riders? To answer these
questions, an examination of the differences between actual
and perceived waiting times for riders of another rapid
transit line is necessary - that is, one must establish a
"control group". [It must be stressed that this will not
"prove" that the past troubles "caused" the exaggeration.]
The "control group" examined was the Blue Line.
The Blue Line is another of the MBTA's rapid transit
lines. 1 3  It carries about 30,000 riders a day, is a little
over six miles long and also acts as a commuter link between
the CBD and the outlying area. Although much smaller than
the Red Line, the Blue Line (in effect) is much like the
north side of the Red Line - riders take the first train
that comes along and it is relatively over capacity.
[Although the Blue Line riders don't face the capacity
problems and the exclusive choice of Ashmont or Braintree
line riders a comparison of southside service will be
enlightening as well]. Operationally, the Blue Line is much
simpler; the cars and track are relatively new; there is no
ATO system, just wayside signalling, no capacity problems
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and no planned extensions, and perhaps most importantly
there were no "problems" as with the Red Line in 1983 -
service has been reliable, predictable and (mostly)
uncongested. [In short, a fairly good control group.]
A sample of six days (9 headways) generated a mean
headway of 3.74 minutes (standard deviation of 1.52 minutes
- much smaller than for any Red Line route). This, in turn,
indicates a mean waiting time of 2.18 minutes (standard
deviation 1.57 minutes). The derived actual waiting times
are shown in Table 3.1. 100 passengers were asked
essentially the same questions as were asked of Red Line
riders - therfore, providing a distribution for perceived
waiting times. These values are presented in Table 3.2 and
the differences (as for the Red Line data) is presented in
Table 3.3A. [All data was gathered at Government Center
station which is analogous to Park Street on the Red Line.]
Examination of these numbers reveal some surprising
results. 14 Although Blue Line riders did exaggerate, they
did not exaggerate by nearly as much as the riders on any of
the Red Line routes - even the afternoon northbound riders.
In fact, such accuracy is somewhat unexpected - perhaps,
since the variance is so low, Blue Line riders know what to
expect and they can make accurate estimates. Or perhaps,
they were not subject to the earlier delays or the present
aggravation of congestion (and somewhat more variance) that
face many Red Line riders.
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With the data presented, it is relatively safe to say
that Blue Line riders make better estimates than Red Line
riders - but why? Intuitively, it seems plausible that Red
Line riders' "over-exaggeration" may be due to the
combination of a number of reasons: the frustrations
experienced in late 1983 and the present capacity issues are
only two. The fact that not all Red Line riders make
equally "bad" estimates confounds matters as well. For
instance, at all values of "x", morning riders from Harvard
Square make better estimates than any of the afternoon
riders, especially the southbound ones, which again is
probably due to a combination of complex cognitive processes
that attempt to incorporate the notions of congestion,
relative performance, reliability and so forth. There are
many issues left to explore - especially those dealing with
the difference between perception and reality. These issues
are addressed somewhat in Chapter 4. However, before
concluding this chapter, I will analyze the issue of
relative performance - a related phenomenon in the realm of
perception versus reality.
As stated before several times, there was/is much
confusion as to the amount of trains that go to Ashmont and
Braintree. [Recall that each lines' riders feel the other
often gets more trains.] Over the course of the survey I
counted 358 southbound trains out of Park Street. [This is
20 more than presented in the earlier data because I was
slightly less stringent on the rush hour times.] Of these
-42-
358 trains, 156 were headed to Ashmont and 202 headed to
Braintree. Note that the "T" plans more trains on the
Braintree line because more people use it and round-trips
take longer. But without very accurate patronage values,
how many trains is enough? This question can only be
answered with better data on patronage patterns. One issue
that can be addressed is the expectancy of alternating
trains, that is, riders expect that if a Braintree train is
at the station currently, an Ashmont train "should" be the
next train. In fact, many riders complain that they often
see "two or three Braintree [or Ashmont, for Braintree
riders] in a row before an Ashmont [or Braintree] train
arrives". During my study, two Braintree trains came in a
row 60 times, as compared to 15 times for two Ashmont trains
in a row. [On six times, three Braintree trains came
consecutively and twice, three Ashmont trains came
consecutively.] Clearly, the operational issues discussed
in both Chapter 1 and Appendix 1 must be acknowledged -
i.e., the order in which trains enter the tunnel at Andrew
cannot be altered and the fact that the "T" currently (after
March 10) schedules 17-18 Braintree trains and only 12-13
Ashmont trains per rush - but that would ignore the issue
addressed in Chapter 3. Perception is different than
reality, so at the very least, the "T" should address
people's expectations of alternating trains - which is
logistically impossible given the entrance into the tunnel
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and simply the planned ratio of Braintree to Ashmont trains,
but informing riders of these "constraints" is not
impossible and will be addressed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: Suggestions
In this chapter, I will offer suggestions to improve
the perception of service. I have made numerous suggestions
for improving actual service, most of which regard material
presented in appendix 1. Consequently, the suggestions are
presented in appendix la. Although there are definite
capacity problems and occasional long delays in service, it
may be that the most immediate "problem" of the Red Line is
the difference between reality and perception. If effective
information dissemination is the key to reducing this
difference, "better" communications is essential. First and
foremost, MBTA public relations should inform the public
about what is actually going on with the Red Line. This
could be simply and relatively inexpensively accomplished by
commissioning advertisements in the daily newspapers
explaining the important aspects of servce - from the
rider's point of view. A good start would be answering
such questions as: why there are more Braintree than
Ashmont trains; why there are crossovers (turn-arounds) at
Park Street; what happens when there are delays, not just
that there are delays; if the often congested, sometimes
dangerous conditions on the stairs at Harvard Square station
are only temporary and why trains "stop for no apparent
reason" on the Longfellow Bridge between the Charles and
Kendall Square stations? [These last two are relatively
straightforward. First, the congestion on the stairs will
be markedly reduced when the nearly completed bus terminal
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is finished; until then, however, it may take nearly three
minutes to climb 30 stairs due to crowding. Secondly, it is
reported that trains often stop on the Longfellow Bridge for
a minute (or sometimes longer) before proceeding to Kendall
Square station - although there are sometimes mechanical
difficulties, often this is a simple safety procedure to
ensure trains from rolling into one another as Kendall
Square is downhill from the bridge.]
Secondly, the "T" must address the current public
addressing system that notifies riders of delays and so
forth. During peak hours, due to noise from people and
trains, very often announcements cannot be understood or
even heard. Moreover, when the announcements are heard they
are so frequent they often annoy more than assist. On the
many days I was in the station, when announcements stating
that there were delays occurring - which happened at least
once on about half of the days - many people on the platform
offered collective snide remarks. Granted most riders do
not stay the entire rush, but most riders none-the-less
mentioned they "hear about" delays frequently; which
effectively (perceptively) has the impact of making delays
seem usual, which is not the case. As a related issue, it
is also reported that during non-peak hours the reverse
occurs - not enough notifications are made. For example,
during the preparation of this thesis, a friend asked me how
long she could expect to wait for a train - although it was
slightly past the rush hour, I told her about six or seven
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minutes ( being very conservative for the north side of the
line). The next day she told me she timed her wait - it was
28 minutes - although statistically a very rare occurrence.
The "really aggravating thing" was that there were no
announcements to inform riders of delays at the station
(Kendall Square) during the entire waiting time. Since she
had to be somewhere at a certain time, if she knew or was
told that a train wouldn't be arriving for a half hour (due
to delays) she could have decided to leave and take a cab
(or walk) - instead of waiting anxiously minute after
minute. Granted, Kendall Square is not most heavily used
station, and procedures do slip a little during non-peak
times, but more effort must be made. Since one of the
biggest distortions is in the perception of waiting time,
better notification of the arrival times of trains to at
least certain stations would help alleviate this problem; at
the very least, it would allow passengers to decide whether
they would like to wait for the trains to arrive or seek
alternative methods of transportation. Although time
consuming and possibly impractical, if the central public
address system currently employed is inadequate for this;
local station public address systems which may be more
effective should be used.
A better, yet more costly method would be the
installation of information signs that tell of the arrival
and destination of the next available train(s), much like
the monitors used in airports. This would be especially
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useful during delays; as mentioned, delays cause excessive
congestion on the trains. Due to operational factors,
several trains often get "backed up" behind a disabled
train. For example, a single 15 minute headway is often
followed by a couple of 3-minute headways. However, as
occured many times during survey days, announcements stating
that there were/are several trains just behind the disabled
train were not made. Consequently, passengers crammed into
the first, already crowded (disabled) train - often over 250
people/car or nearly 50% over design capacity. Not only is
this extremely uncomfortable, it is also potentially
dangerous, and highly unnecessary, since the next few trains
often just outside the station entrance roll through at
about 25-50% capacity. A sign-board, at maybe just the most
heavily patronized stations if funding is a constraint,
would let the passengers know of soon-to-arrive trains,
easing the congestion on trains and demands on the central
announcer. This would have to be an on-line real time
system similar in many respects to the one currently used by
the central dispatcher, though not nearly as elaborate.
Extended arrival times need not be exact but would put the
passengers' at ease more than the current lack of
communication system. This may be particularly useful for
addressing riders' expectations of alternating Ashmont and
Braintree trains; which due to the operational factors
mentioned earlier, does not always occur. Many riders
agree.
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Another issue regards congestion. As mentioned,
present capacity is an issue for soutside much more than the
north - although, when the northside extension is complete
and the new cars arrive and stations and trains are extended
for six cars each, it will be a much more complex issue.
Until then, besides better scheduling and more preventative
maintenance, there are other ways to address congestion.
First of all, trains headed southbound are crowded, but
passengers make them more crowded than need be. On numerous
occassions, at several different stations, I saw passengers
crowd on to either the two front or the two middle cars of
the train and leave the other much less utilized: the
difference in car load (between different cars) was as much
as 100% at certain times. Although people have many reasons
for getting in only certain cars (being closer to the
entrance or exit staircases for example), encouraging them
with directional signs and verbal messages by train starters
to spread out more evenly on the platform would not only
make conditions on the train and platform more comfortable,
but also reduce the "dwell" or boarding time spent in
stations. [Saving 10 or 15 seconds a stop can add up to the
6 or so minutes per round trip necessary to be able to drop
a train entirely, which saves money without reducing service
substantially. ]
Another complaint of riders regards the coordination
between buses and trains at such stations as Ashmont, Quincy
Center and Harvard Square. One rider mentioned that "no
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matter when [she] leaves Park Street, [she] arrives at
Harvard Square two minutes after [her] bus leaves - so [she]
has to wait another 20 minutes for the next bus [to
arrive]." A second example occurs when buses pull into the
station and many (e.g. 50) people run toward the platform
and miss a train just as it pulls out - this, of course, is
made worse during non-peak hours when trains and buses run
less often. Even though the "T" has a policy of holding
infrequently scheduled buses [or trains] when the other
arrives late - rigid practice even proactive efforts by the
station masters would help alleviate these problems - since
even if these "misses" are out of the ordinary, these events
are "very frustrating", as shown, riders form their
perception by weighting the aggravating experience more than
the usual events.
The final suggestion is on somewhat of an upbeat note.
That is, currently at several stations, musicians often set
up on the platform and play. When I asked riders about the
music, they were often pleased (when it was good) that the
musicians were there. Since this paper has addressed the
big difference in perception and reality; it may be that,
even without major operational changes, an implementation of
the more subtle recommendations mentioned (such as the
sign-board, encouraging musicians and other diversions like
newspaper and sundry stands, etc.) may be the most effective
way of reducing distortions in perception.
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Appendix 115
There are several important operational issues that
should be understood when evaluating service on the Red Line
- these include the ATO system, scheduling, maintenance and
so forth. This appendix presents a complete, though brief,
study of these issues. These issues will be referred to in
Chapter 4 when suggestions for improvement are discussed.
The automatic train operator system (ATO) sets the
speed and distance between trains. The ATO system replaces
a wayside signalling system - a reliable, old fashioned
method that keeps the trains two signals, or roughly 600
yards, apart. Although fundamentally sound, prudent, and
safety-conscious, the ATO is very temperamental;
malfunctions occur frequently. The ATO system communicates
to the central dispatching center (and other trains) via
radio waves; however, these radio waves can be distorted
many ways. For example, excessive braking can flatten out
the metal wheels on the trains slightly, which, when the
train is in motion, causes a resonance of a similar
frequency as that used by the ATO system; this in turn
distorts or even impedes the ATO's signals. There are other
eccentricities with the system, but the main result is that
when malfunctions occur, a train must be taken off the ATO
system and put on a backup system (not wayside signaling)
which requires that a train travel at a speed of only 25
miles per hour (often only half of its planned speed); which
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will cause delays until either the malfunction is fixed or
the train is taken out of service (discussed later).
Another, somewhat related issue is preventative
maintenance. The Red Line currently operates with a fleet
of 164 cars, most of which are over 20 years old and have
traveled nearly 1,000,000 miles. Currently, only about 120
are available for usage, the remainder being in various
stages of (dis)repair. Consequently, car availability
becomes a weekly, sometimes even daily concern. Recently,
there was a major public disagreement about the MBTA's 1977
decision to refurbish 88 of the Red Line cars in-house at a
then estimated cost of about a quarter of a million dollars
per car. However, the project was scratched in 1981 when
the "T" had only fixed 18 cars, at a cost of about $600,000
apiece. The "T" cited many reasons for this overun,
including the installation of the previously unscheduled ATO
system; regardless, the job is now being completed by an
outside contractor who has completed about a dozen cars and
is scheduled to finish the rest within a year. [In early
1984, the MBTA also purchased 54 brand new Red Line cars to
be delivered in early 1986, by a Detroit company, for about
52 million dollars.]16
In the meantime however, preventative maintenance,
especially at the repair yard, remains a somewhat constant
battle. To combat this, the "T" has appropriately scheduled
repair crews on a night shift from 9:30 PM to 6:00 AM so
that inspections and more work can be done. Yet, a major
-52-
obstacle at the repair yard remains between management and
two separate repair groups. One group repairs only the ATO
system, while the other repairs only the more traditional
parts of the car (hydraulics, on-board electrical system,
brakes, propulsion motors, etc.). A problem often arises
because it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the
problem is due to an ATO or a traditional car body problem;
consequently, significant time is lost as the two groups try
to decide who will actually work on the problem. This issue
is further complicated by the fact that the Red Line
currently uses the most antiquated equipment (which includes
the track, tunnels, signals and power cables as well as
cars) of any of the MBTA's rapid transit lines (RTL), which
by itself accounts for many of the "problems" on the Red
Line. [In contrast, the Orange Line - another of the MBTA's
RTL - has all new cars and has one of the best performance
records in the country, completing nearly 99% of all
scheduled trips on time.] When both the rebuilt and the new
cars arrive, these problems may not be as critical, but
until then, effort must be made to rectify these issues.
Another issue regarding maintenance is the actual
location of the repair yards. During the weekdays, Red Line
trains are composed of four cars. However, repair and
storage for 4-car trains are available only at one place,
the Cabot yard which is in the center of the line, between
Broadway and Andrew Stations. Consequently, if a train is
disabled (due to either an ATO malfunction, or the automatic
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car doors not opening properly, or a braking or
communications problems, etc.), with few exceptions the
train must travel from wherever it is on the line to this
single repair yard - usually unloaded and at a reduced
speed. Therefore, since the track is a closed loop, as this
train travels to the repair yard it usually causes backups
throughout the entire system. In effect, one disabled train
can often propagate delays (that can last as long as 30-45
minutes) throughout the entire system. A possible solution
to this would be temporary repair or storage yards placed at
the endpoints of the line (Harvard Square, Ashmont and
Braintree stations), so that a train need only travel to its
nearest repair yard, and the entire system is not held up
while an empty train heads to the central repair yard.
[This is costly as well; it is estimated that the "T"
currently spends nearly $100,000 a year just moving empty
trains to this repair yard.] Although there is a small
2-car repair yard at Ashmont, it is inadequate; repair or
storage yards have been unavailable due to economic and
(mostly) local political reasons.
The actual ongoing operations of scheduling the
trains are noteworthy as well. There is a central command
center in downtown Boston that is connected to the entire
Red Line system. Via a console panel about 20 feet long and
four feet high that displays the position of trains in
color, dispatchers and schedulers have access to real-time
information about the location of trains and their status
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(whether on ATO or not) and the capability to change most
signals and switches. While on the ATO system, trains
basically "run" themselves. However, if delays occur (or if
off the ATO) these planners dictate where and when the train
should move. As mentioned previously, the "T" plans uniform
headways - in practice however, due to many reasons (long
dwell time in stations, minor track or car body
malfunctions, etc.), this rarely occurs for an entire rush.
Consequently, when "problems" occur, with the use of this
console, dispatchers try to even out the headways by a
number of methods, including cross-overs, "holding-up" at
certain stations briefly and/or express trains. Dispatching
is a difficult and critical job - requiring almost as
complex communications and fast actions as for air traffic
controllers. It is important to remember that once a train
enters the tunnel between Andrew and Harvard Square, its
relative position cannot be changed; that is, Ashmont and
Braintree trains are scheduled to enter the tunnel at two
minutes apart. Due to delays, however, two Ashmont (or
Braintree) trains can (and often do) enter the tunnel
successively; and not until they return out of the tunnel
can they switch relative positions (get a Braintree between
them). Again, each of these factors are discussed further
in subsequent chapters.
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Appendix lA1 7
First of all, when the stations north of Harvard
Square are opened in 1985, due to the increased track length
(trip time) and patronage (a potential of 20,000 new riders
daily) if service (headway/waiting times) is to remain even
at its present level, many more Red Line cars, than used
presently, will be needed. Furthermore increasing train
sizes to six cars each - which is planned within the next
few years as current station platforms are extended -
although a sound strategy for relieving congestion, puts
even further demands on the necessary number of cars.
Arrival of the newly ordered and refurbished cars (over 100
cars in total) will be of great help, yet by that time many
of the present fleet will be in need of repair.
Consequently, I reiterate: preventative maintenance on the
cars, tracks, tunnels, power cables, communication lines and
the ATO system is essential for success; coordination and
cooperation of repair personnel and effective, proactive
management are critical; continual lobbying for the repair
and/or storage facilities at the lines' endpoints (Ashmont,
Braintree and/or Ailewife stations) must be stressed. As
the performance of the Orange Line mentioned earlier
indicates, there is no replacement for properly maintained
equipment.
The second recommendation is (also) primarily
management's responsibility. Preventative maintenance,
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station and track extensions and the purchase of new Red
Line cars are very expensive: the 3.2 mile extension north
of Harvard Square will cost nearly $600 million, alone.
Strict internal audit control and validation of outside
vendors' claims must be emphasized. A recent state
auditors' report indicated that an electrical subcontractor
for the Red Line's recently opened, Qunicy Adams station,
misappropriated over $150,000 by simply installing
inferior-grade lighting fixtures as specified. 18
System-wide, between 1977 and 1981 alone, well over $230
million has been paid without independent verification.
And, on the Green Line, although the manufacturer had to pay
substantial fines, recently ordered streetcars were so
faulty that each one required nearly 300 separate repairs.
Other issues, such as payouts of questionable workmen's
compensation benefits, unnecessary finance charges and
simply inoperative collection machines have been costly.
(Presently about 10% of the automatic pass-readers on the
Red Line are malfunctioning). Simply put, better financial
control is warranted.
There are other recommendations: (1) considering
planned express trains southbound (for the evening rush) out
of Park and Washington Street stations to near the lines'
endpoints (e.g. Quincy Center and Fields Corner; this may
alleviate some "local" congestion for passengers who must
endure longer trips, (2) better communication within the
ranks of the "T" itself - getting ideas from motormen to
-57-
management and vice versa as fast as possible; and (3)
continually estimating usage (ridership) patterns, striving
to schedule headways (trains) to meet peak (usage) times:
perhaps by planning asymmetric headway patterns versus
uniform ones. In fact, this final suggestion may be the
most easily implemented. Simply compiling the statistics as
presented in this report will provide an inexpensive way of
getting "better" performance measures - at least from the
rider's point of view.
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Appendix 2
To gather data that would be most representative of
what the majority of riders experienced, I concentrated
data-gathering efforts on weekday rush hours only. More-
over, most of the data was gathered at Park, Washington
and Harvard Square stations - the most heavily patronized.
These stations provide representations of both morning and
afternoon northside service and afternoon southside service;
only morning southside service is "under-represented" - this
is discussed in the body of the paper. The actual data-
gathering days (rush hours) were randomly selected in
advance and spanned over the four month period to approxi-
mate different conditions such as weather patterns and
within (and across) week variation in patronage. The data
that was gathered ranged from:
1) January 18 to May 1 (14 individual days each)
for both the afternoon rush toward Ashmont and
toward Braintree.
2) January 18 to May 1 (15 individual days) for
the afternoon rush toward Harvard Square.
3) January 20 to April 27 (6 individual days) for
the morning rush out of Harvard Square.
4) January 26 to March 28 (4 individual days) for
afternoon travel times from Park to Harvard Sq.
5) April 4 to April 26 (6 individual days) for
afternoon Blue Line service (discussed in Ch. 3).
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Appendix 3
For further illustration, histograms of the data are presented
on the following pages. All headway times have been rounded to the
nearest half-minute.
Note: (1) The number of observations are the number of headways.
(2) The intervals are half-minute wide (e.g., if middle of
interval is 1.5 then the asterisks represent the
number of headways that were 1.5 minutes long).
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NORTHSIDE SERVICE
Morning Rush from Harvard Square Southbound (towards Park/Wash.)
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Afternoon Rush Southbound (from Park/Wash.) toward Braintree
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ACTUAL TRAVEL TIMES (NORTHSIDE)
Morning Travel Times from Harvard Square to Kendall Square
(outliers of 22.5 and 28 minute omitted)
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BLUE LINE AND "TIME-IN-TRANSIT" VARIANCE
Blue Line Data-Outbound from Government Center
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FOOTNOTES
This data and most of the material in this paragraph was
completed from a combination of sample distributions generated
from data gathered at Harvard Square, converstations with the
Supervisor of the Red Line, John Hogan, and a September 1983
MBTA document entitled, "Red Line Operating Plan".
From comments of randomly selected regular riders I surveyed
during data gathering over the four month period.
These terms were generated for this report by a composite of
riders' perceptions.
See footnote 2.
5 From an article in the Cambridge TAB, "The Track Record" by
Brian Murphy, March 21, 1984.
See footnote 2.
The material presented throughout the next two chapters was
based on the sources mentioned in footnote 1 and other data
gathered during the many days of sampling throughout the MBTA's
Red Line system - unless otherwise noted.
8 See footnote 5 and the Cambridge TAB, February 8, 1984.
There was a fire at Andrew Station that halted service on the
Red Line for about 45 minutes on March 9. At first, just
incoming northbound service was affected, but eventually
southbound from Harvard Square was (although not apparent in
the aforementioned rider's data who was travelling that day)
reportedly affected; consequently, even though I was not
gathering data at Harvard Square, the figures presented in the
next chapter will include this "outlier" to offer a more
representative sample.
10 Professor Barnett's (my thesis advisor) term. Most of the
derivations for waiting time distributions and much of the
conceptual framework that follow here and in Chapter 3 are
generated from numerousddiscussions with Professor Barnett and
referencing his paper, "Control Strategies for Transport Systems
with Nonlinear Waiting Costs," published in Transportation
Science, vol. 12, No. 2, May 1978.
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FOOTNOTES (cont.)
11
In Chapter 3, I will analyze the perception of riders. In doing
so, the probability distributions for these actual waiting times
will be derived. For comparisons, riders are asked about their
perceptions over the last three months (regardless and usually
incognizant of the change in schedule); consequently, I'll simply
combine the two headways as if no change was made. This sample
of 14 days (190 headways) generates a mean headway of 6.45
(standard deviation of 3.53); which indicates a waiting time mean
of 4.19 minutes (standard deviation of 3.31 minutes).
12 See footnote 10.
13 See footnotes 1 and 7.
14 Note: Although differences in percentages between the Blue and
Red Line are substantial, the ratios are less so. Due to a
combination of the exaggerating effect outliers have on the mean
(of perceived waits) and the relatively low actual waits, Blue Line
ratios appear "inflated". This is especially evident when comparing
the difference between the mean and median (of perceived walts>-for
the Red and Blue Lines: Red Line generates a much smaller difference.
15 See footnotes 1 and 7.
16 Ibid and recent articles in local papers such as the Boston Globe,
Magazine section article by Charles Kenney, April 22, 1984 and
the Patriot Ledger.
17 See footnotes 1 and 7.
18 From Massachusetts' "State Auditor's Report on the Activities of
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, January 2, 1981 to
December 31, 1981," and 1983 report no. 83-583-6 from the same
agency.
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